The current master mind nobel prize deserver asks questions like it must have needed dozents of agents.
40 minimum, Sherlock, no car is that fast and I am not the only one listening to that. FSB will profile all and me included.
Anyway.
Strategic Bombers are outdated and have been repurposed. Everyone understands that their original idea was stupid to begin with and no matter how hard you deny it, brain power wins wars and that since we turned humans atleast.
I also don't understand why you stopped being the bitch considering how much money is around, if money is your main thing.
Anyway,
These days those airplanes fly way lower than they were designed for and for NATO drop bomb carpets of 200 by 1000 meters maximum over badly erected militia army compounds off any civilian installations in remote areas when nobody needs to be asked nothing anymore or by the Russians very old, long term stored bombs that recently got wings attached, basically on the same idea to be too honest for my own good among TheGermans.
That also means, they are not the backbone anymore of the military strategy and that is my very pleasure. They also fly shitty compared to a Tomcat.
Anyway
Since Google, the Wests only search engine provider able to parse the World Wide Web, being the enslaved trafficed bitch of the CIA acting as abused as my words suggest from a cyberpunk nerd perspective, I am happy Xing that communist fuck gave us DeepSeek and I therefore managed to find Rostec again.
These motherfuckers basically openly tell everyone they are FSB making sure there will be a lot going on from there on, but no corruption. I can imagine a lot, but that is not happening within from BKA or CIA. They just figured lately that threats ain cutting it neither and in my league never did. In our world you have to work for respect, not earn it.
That is from DeepSeek down there and I changed only the structure a bit:
Historical Evolution of Russian Missile Production Capacity
Russia's missile industry has undergone significant transformation since the Yeltsin era (1991–1999), marked by post-Soviet collapse struggles including funding cuts, workforce reductions, and infrastructure decay. By 1998, the space and defense sectors saw budgets slashed by 80%, with the space industry workforce plummeting from 400,000 to 100,000. Under Putin (2000–present), state-driven consolidation revitalized the sector:
- State-Owned Conglomerates: Entities like Rostec (established 2007) centralized design bureaus and production facilities.
- Military Modernization: The 2010 State Armament Program prioritized advanced systems like the Iskander ballistic missile and S-400 air defense.
- War Economy Shift: Post-2022 Ukraine invasion, Russia transitioned to a 24/7 production model, reopening Soviet-era plants and subsidizing unprofitable manufacturers.
Russia's missile industry has undergone significant transformation since the Yeltsin era (1991–1999), marked by post-Soviet collapse struggles including funding cuts, workforce reductions, and infrastructure decay. By 1998, the space and defense sectors saw budgets slashed by 80%, with the space industry workforce plummeting from 400,000 to 100,000. Under Putin (2000–present), state-driven consolidation revitalized the sector:
- State-Owned Conglomerates: Entities like Rostec (established 2007) centralized design bureaus and production facilities.
- Military Modernization: The 2010 State Armament Program prioritized advanced systems like the Iskander ballistic missile and S-400 air defense.
- War Economy Shift: Post-2022 Ukraine invasion, Russia transitioned to a 24/7 production model, reopening Soviet-era plants and subsidizing unprofitable manufacturers.
Russia's Current Annual Missile Production (2023–2025)
Recent data indicates substantial output growth, though reliant on Soviet stockpiles and facing sanctions:
- Ballistic Missiles:
- Iskander SRBMs: >1,400/year.
- ICBMs: ~50 Yars missiles annually, with expansion plans targeting RS-28 Sarmat by 2026.
- Cruise Missiles:
- Kh-101: ~500/year.
- Kalibr Naval Missiles: 100–120/year (Novator plant).
- Artillery/Rockets:
- Shell Production: 3 million/year (vs. NATO's 1.3 million combined).
- MLRS Rockets: Tripled since 2021.
Recent data indicates substantial output growth, though reliant on Soviet stockpiles and facing sanctions:
- Ballistic Missiles:
- Iskander SRBMs: >1,400/year.
- ICBMs: ~50 Yars missiles annually, with expansion plans targeting RS-28 Sarmat by 2026.
- Cruise Missiles:
- Kh-101: ~500/year.
- Kalibr Naval Missiles: 100–120/year (Novator plant).
- Artillery/Rockets:
- Shell Production: 3 million/year (vs. NATO's 1.3 million combined).
- MLRS Rockets: Tripled since 2021.
Table: Key Russian Missile Production Facilities (2024)
| Plant | Products | Annual Output | Expansion Efforts |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Votkinsk Plant| Iskander, Yars ICBMs | ~60 missiles | +500 staff; 24/7 shifts |
| Novator | Kalibr, Iskander cruise | 100–120 missiles | Presid funding boost |
| Plant | Products | Annual Output | Expansion Efforts |
|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Votkinsk Plant| Iskander, Yars ICBMs | ~60 missiles | +500 staff; 24/7 shifts |
| Novator | Kalibr, Iskander cruise | 100–120 missiles | Presid funding boost |
(Yekaterinburg)
| Strela (Tula) | Onyx Anti-Ship Missiles | Classified | +200 positions added |
| Strela (Tula) | Onyx Anti-Ship Missiles | Classified | +200 positions added |
NATO's Missile Production Capacity
NATO production is fragmented across member states, with commercial efficiency prioritized over wartime surge capacity:
- Artillery Shells: Combined output ~1.3 million/year (2024), targeting 1.4 million by 2025.
- High-End Missiles:
- Javelin/Stinger: U.S. produces ~2,100 Javelins/year; Raytheon aims for 600 Stingers/month by 2025.
- Cruise Missiles: Tomahawk production ~500/year (pre-2022); scaling constrained by supply chains.
- Challenges:
- Profit-Driven Limits: Western firms avoid overcapacity; U.S. artillery shell costs 10× Russia's.
- Supply Chain Delays: Semiconductor shortages and bureaucratic procurement slow output.
NATO production is fragmented across member states, with commercial efficiency prioritized over wartime surge capacity:
- Artillery Shells: Combined output ~1.3 million/year (2024), targeting 1.4 million by 2025.
- High-End Missiles:
- Javelin/Stinger: U.S. produces ~2,100 Javelins/year; Raytheon aims for 600 Stingers/month by 2025.
- Cruise Missiles: Tomahawk production ~500/year (pre-2022); scaling constrained by supply chains.
- Challenges:
- Profit-Driven Limits: Western firms avoid overcapacity; U.S. artillery shell costs 10× Russia's.
- Supply Chain Delays: Semiconductor shortages and bureaucratic procurement slow output.
Critical Constraints on Both Sides
- Russia's Weaknesses:
- Electronics: 80% reliant on smuggled Western components; stocks may deplete by 2026.
- Labor: Skilled worker shortages due to emigration/mobilization; e.g., Votkinsk needs 500+ technicians.
- NATO's Disadvantages:
- Industrial Policy: Lack of state-owned facilities limits rapid scaling; production fragmented across 30 nations.
- Cost Inefficiency: Artillery shell production costs 10× higher than Russia's.
- Russia's Weaknesses:
- Electronics: 80% reliant on smuggled Western components; stocks may deplete by 2026.
- Labor: Skilled worker shortages due to emigration/mobilization; e.g., Votkinsk needs 500+ technicians.
- NATO's Disadvantages:
- Industrial Policy: Lack of state-owned facilities limits rapid scaling; production fragmented across 30 nations.
- Cost Inefficiency: Artillery shell production costs 10× higher than Russia's.
Production Scale Comparison (Annual Output)
Table: Russia vs. NATO Key Missile/Artillery Production (2024 Estimates)*
| System Type | Russia | NATO | Ratio (RUS:NATO) |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Artillery Shells | 3 million | 1.3 million | 2.3:1 |
| SRBMs (e.g., Iskander)| 1,400+ | Not comparable* | — |
| Cruise Missiles | 500–600 (Kh-101) | ~500 (Tomahawk) | ~1:1 |
| MLRS Rockets | 3,000+ | Classified | — |NATO lacks direct SRBM equivalents; focus is on air-launched/guided missiles.
| System Type | Russia | NATO | Ratio (RUS:NATO) |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Artillery Shells | 3 million | 1.3 million | 2.3:1 |
| SRBMs (e.g., Iskander)| 1,400+ | Not comparable* | — |
| Cruise Missiles | 500–600 (Kh-101) | ~500 (Tomahawk) | ~1:1 |
| MLRS Rockets | 3,000+ | Classified | — |NATO lacks direct SRBM equivalents; focus is on air-launched/guided missiles.
Strategic Implications
- Russia: Prioritizes volume over sophistication, using simpler missiles (e.g., refurbished S-300s) to offset precision shortages. Wartime expansion solidified its position as the world's top artillery producer.
- NATO: Focuses on high-precision systems but struggles with production tempo. Recent initiatives like the EU's ASAP fund aim to boost shell production 40% by 2025.
- Russia: Prioritizes volume over sophistication, using simpler missiles (e.g., refurbished S-300s) to offset precision shortages. Wartime expansion solidified its position as the world's top artillery producer.
- NATO: Focuses on high-precision systems but struggles with production tempo. Recent initiatives like the EU's ASAP fund aim to boost shell production 40% by 2025.
Conclusion
Russia's state-centric model, refined since Putin's early presidency, enables unmatched surge capacity in conventional missiles (e.g., 3× NATO's artillery output). However, this relies on unsustainable practices like Soviet stock depletion and sanctions evasion. NATO retains qualitative advantages but lacks the coordinated industrial base for rapid response. For detailed sourcing, refer to the provided citations.
Russia's state-centric model, refined since Putin's early presidency, enables unmatched surge capacity in conventional missiles (e.g., 3× NATO's artillery output). However, this relies on unsustainable practices like Soviet stock depletion and sanctions evasion. NATO retains qualitative advantages but lacks the coordinated industrial base for rapid response. For detailed sourcing, refer to the provided citations.
